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Abstract 
Mobile peer-to-peer networks are quite prevalent and popular now days due 
to advent of business scenarios where all the services are going mobile like 
whether it’s to find good restaurants, healthy diet books making friends, job-
hunting, real state info or cab-sharing etc. As the mobile users are increasing 
day by day, peer-to-peer networks getting bigger and complex. In contrast to 
client server system in peer-to-peer network resource sharing is done on the 
basis of mutual consent and agreed policies with no central authority and 
controlling entity. Incentive schemes for P2P networks are devised to 
encourage the participation and to adhere the policies agreed. P2P services 
based only on altruistic behaviour of users are facing serious challenges like 
“Free riding” or “The tragedy of commons”. Free riders are the users who 
consume the bandwidth of the system (perform downloading) but don’t show 
altruistic behaviour (deny uploading) and act as a parasite for the P2P network. 
To counter the free riding issue many Incentive schemes are suggested by the 
researchers. In this paper we will survey the different incentive schemes, their 
architectures keeping eye on how they handle the challenges of modern P2P 
network.   
 Introduction  
Since the advent of first p2p network “Napster” many such networks have 
come up with improved performance and services such as “Gnutella” and 
“FreeNet” but in the end they all are facing challenges like free riders and 
violation of copyright laws. Ensuring and stimulating cooperation among users 
is prime concern if we want to run any p2p network smoothly but doing so is 
quite difficult stuff since in p2p sharing networks, we don’t have central 
monitory system or statistics analysis repository. 
 
Figure-1 Basic Napster Architecture 
Maintaining such central authority is in contrast to the spirit of P2P paradigm 
where users enjoy the unmatchable level of openness, freedom and 
anonymity. In such environment where no one is keeping track of your 
activities, its obvious tendency of users to deny cooperation by not sharing 
their resources while consuming network’s scarce bandwidth at the same time. 
It has been observed that in case of popular p2p network “Gnutella” almost 
70% of users don’t share anything while more than 50% of the sharing is done 
by top 1% of users [Eytan Adar and Bernardo A. Huberman]. This means 70% of the 
user are doing no good to the system and still they getting benefitted through 
it. System is totally relying on the altruistic behaviour of the top 1-2% of the 
hosts and as the free riders increase it degrades the quality of services since 
the search horizon becomes over crowed and many requests are failed to be 
responded by the system as request message crosses it’s time to live before 
reaching appropriate hosts. Like in Gnutella as we have seen most of the 
responses are given by few top hosts, due to increase in free riders at some 
point of time these top hosts will get overwhelmed by requests and saturated 
to service further. 
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Figure-2 Free Riding In Currently Prevalent P2P Networks 
 As depicted in Figure-2 most of the peers don’t share but download only that’s 
why performance and content availability decreases. To get rid of free riding in 
Napster, by default, downloads all files into a shared upload directory. In this 
way when a user downloads a file it is automatically shared.  
To encourage the cooperation and reduce the impact of free riders in p2p 
environment incentive schemes are devised for p2p sharing networks. These 
schemes distribute rewards in terms of money (micro payments) or usage 
coupons etc. to the users who cooperate by sharing their resources positively. 
Alternatively rather than providing incentives to users who are not free riders, 
we can provide them better quality of service (QoS). There are so many such 
incentive schemes are suggested for p2p systems such as game theoretic 
incentive distribution, reputation based incentive schemes (Eigen trust), 
Asymmetric incentive schemes and auction based approaches etc.   
Game-theoretic P2P file-sharing incentive model 
In this approach rather than relying on altruistic behaviour of hosts system 
provides incentives to the users based on their sharing and downloads, users 
are allowed to choose their level of sharing and downloading. Users try to 
maximize their rewards by constructing a game theoretic approach and by 
managing to get incentives. In this technique resource bidding is performed, 
peer nodes compete for resource allocation as game theory architecture.   
In this scheme it’s quite important to identify the files shared by the users to 
pay appropriate royalties to them and to check the false claims of sharing if 
any.  
Sharing: It’s totally up to user to select the level of sharing, he is convenient 
with. There are different levels of sharing mode like No sharing, moderate and 
all shared. 
Downloading: Similar to sharing levels different downloading modes are there 
like no downloads, moderate, heavy downloading. 
Agent Utility Functions:  Agent utility functions govern the choices and 
preferences of users for different scenarios. Agent utility varies based on some 
factors like. 
 Amount to Download (AD)   (Desirable for agents) 
 Network Variety (NV)           (More network choices are desirable) 
 Disk Space Used (DS)         (Cost imposed should be less)    
  Bandwidth Used (BW)        (High upload bandwidth is not desirable) 
 Altruism (AL)                       (Adds utility through satisfaction caused by altruism ) 
  Financial Transfer (FT)       (Agents can spend or earn money by downloading or sharing ) 
 
Now we can state the utility function as linear combination of these factors. 
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Now each user can draw his strategy of usage based his need and resources 
available. It can be the any combination of these sharing and downloading 
levels such as no sharing-heavy downloads , moderate sharing-no downloads 
etc. Each such strategy leads to appropriate agent utility positive or negative. 
Agent utility is the probabilistic consequences of their choice of strategy and it 
depends on various factors such as download size, bandwidth used, incentives, 
network options, disk space etc. each user tries to maximize his utility 
positively and the system enters in an equilibrium. 
Equilibria:  Agents behave rationally during participation as they will try to 
maximize their utility. A weak Nash equilibrium is achieved when no agent can 
gain utility by changing his strategy, provided that all other agents’ strategies 
are fixed. A strong Nash equilibrium is achieved when every agent would be 
strictly worse off if he were to change his strategy, given that all other agents’ 
strategies are fixed.  
Micro payments: Server keep tracks the downloading count and sharing count 
of each user, as any file transfer comes to an end counters for related users are 
modified accordingly. After end of each time period users are charged with 
amount C =f(download - shared). Since a user is charged by same amount for 
downloading a file as the host given incentive for sharing therefore overall sum 
of all micro payments remains zero. 
 
Reputation based incentive model: Eigen Trust 
 
In peer to peer scenario incentive schemes are incorporated to increase 
cooperation and sharing but these mechanisms don’t ensure to avoid false 
claims and inauthentic files uploaded just to get the benefit of uploading 
provided by the system. These are crap files not having any relevant materials 
as it claims to have. To check this kind of issue we have to have some heuristics 
of user’s historical uploads and whether the downloader was satisfied or not. 
To do so we have to maintain reputation of each user to ensure his 
trustworthiness. Having such global trust value malicious users can be 
identified and blocked.    
In this mechanism each host is assigned with a global trust value which is 
calculated on the basis of his past sharing and all the users participate in this 
calculation process. 
Reputation System: Each peer records counts of the satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory experience with each peer it interacts. Global trust value of a 
peer is calculated based on all records provided by each peer he interacted till 
now.  
Trust value = sum of all satisfactory – sum of all unsatisfactory  
The real challenge here is not to calculate local trust values but to aggregate 
them in distributed environment not having any central control to get global 
trust view, problems that can arise due to this are either the whole local trust 
values are not considered or network is flooded with trust request messages. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
Figure-3 Eigen Trust Architecture 
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Basic Eigen Trust: Solution for issues stated above is Eigen Trust, in this 
scheme each peer ‘i’ asks his friends or trusted neighbours ( based on local 
trust heuristics) to suggest the appropriate peer to whom they themselves 
trust therefore peer “i” got trust values of his neighbours of neighbours, 
similarly “i” doing the same steps “i” gets the values of neighbours of 
neighbours of neighbours and so on. 
 Like in Figure-3 peer p6 trusts peer p7 based on his previous experience with it 
(based on satisfactory and unsatisfactory counts) likewise peer p5 trusts on 
peer p6. Now peer p6 recommends peer p7 to peer p5 for interaction as it 
trust p7 and in this way eventually peer p5 starts trusting peer p7. In this way 
each peer can calculate the global trust values for each other peer by doing so 
and without flooding the network with trust value messages. 
 
Issues: Issues that can arise in this approach is there is fair chances of malicious 
users assign high trust value to each other forming an alliance but we can 
avoid such scenarios if we have pre-trusted peers already in the system 
distributed in whole network. 
Isolating Malicious Peers:  Simple and intuitive strategy to avoid malicious 
peers is to download from most trusted peers only but this strategy is not that 
promising as it looks because due to this there will be huge overload on most 
trusted peers to serve every one and system will collapse at some point of time 
and this scheme will also refrain new peers to build reputation. The solution 
for such scenario could be making download decision probabilistically on trust 
values of peers. This scheme will not only balance the load but also will enable 
the newcomers to attain reputation. 
Incenting Free riders to Share: The peers who are most trusted are rewarded 
by incentives. This will not only motivate free riders to start sharing but also it 
will boost peers to share only authentic files and to delete inauthentic ones so 
that high global trust value can be achieved. 
 
 
Auction based incentive scheme in packet forwarding 
service 
In wireless network environment like mobile ad-hoc networks users are used 
to have limited resources such as CPU power, memory space and battery etc, 
therefore they don’t want to share these resources altruistically but they 
rational enough to seek their benefits, Therefore to increase the cooperation 
quality of service incentives should be given in exchange of services. In this 
scheme an auction based incentive model is proposed where each router gets 
paid for packet forwarding.  
Basic algorithm: We can define auction based incentive scheme for packet 
forwarding as follows. 
Flows and Bids: At each router an auction takes place (Auction market) and all 
the packet flows passing through it work as bidders for this router. Bids for 
each flow are set depending on utility of units of bandwidth achieved against 
it. Utility function for each user is linear curve and slope is equal to respective 
bid as shown in Figure-4. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure-4 
 Router’s auction rule: Although this scheme uses generalized vickrey auction 
but with some modification, which is required due to mismatch between user’s 
bid for bandwidth and effort by router to provide that bandwidth. We have to 
consider channel time also for calculating bids for flow. Bid modified as  
b’=b x BW 
Where b’ is modified bid for particular channel time and BW is effective link 
bandwidth. 
Budget Control and Currency Exchange: System assumes that each user is 
having some amount of initial money before participation in system and he can 
earn more money by packet forwarding or can spend money using other user’s 
services (forwarding his own packets through others). Therefore each user can 
assess his wealth status during his participation and use some budget control 
policies such as requesting lesser bandwidth or limiting the session duration.   
Router’s Reserve Price: Reserve price for a router constitutes its operating 
cost, cost of facility, equipment and staffing etc. Therefore based on market 
research of utilities of different users routers can set their reservation cost to 
compensate for providing packet forwarding service. 
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Figure-5 Auction based incentive scheme in packet forwarding 
Router’s Reserve Price: Reserve price for a router constitutes its operating 
cost, cost of facility, equipment and staffing etc. Therefore based on market 
research of utilities of different users routers can set their reservation cost to 
compensate for providing packet forwarding service. 
Maximum Bandwidth for a Flow: If requests of other flows are unchanged 
then a high bidder can get more bandwidth than others or it’s the sum of all 
bandwidths allocated to low bidders or left-overs of high bidders. 
Bottom line is in terms of mechanism, this scheme is quite simple as depicted 
in Figure-5; an auction process runs every time in the network to assign the 
price rate and bandwidth to the routers. Each packet flow constitutes a bid 
with it, that much amount of money he is agreed to pay. At each router a 
Vickery auction takes place for assigning different bandwidths to different 
packet flows based on their bids and it always converge in positive utility for 
the users. 
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 E-ARL: An Economic incentive scheme for Adaptive Revenue-
Load-based dynamic replication of data in Mobile-P2P 
networks 
Data availability and ease of access is elementary requirement and basic 
necessity for any network sharing system but it becomes more and more 
crucial and highly important when we have to deal with mobile networks such 
as mobile P2P networks since there network partitioning kind of situations may 
easily arrive due migration of some peer or some peer may get switched off or 
crashed due to less resources (battery, processing, storage etc.). Therefore 
proper replication of data is needed to avoid low data availability. 
Incentive schemes for replication of data ensure adequate participation and 
collaboration of peers in the system. E-ARL suggests an incentive based 
economic data replication scheme which, not only helps to achieve better 
quality of service but also keeps track of load balancing and revenue balancing 
in the system and improves query response time significantly. On the hand this 
also takes care of free riders since they can’t access anything without paying 
for their content. 
Basic E-ARL economic scheme:  Basic E-ARL economic scheme is quite intuitive 
in terms of processing, each data item is having some virtual monetary value 
based on its demand or importance let us say p when any mobile peer wants 
to access some data item that is kept by some other mobile peer then he has 
to pay p amount of virtual currency to the host peer. Requesting peer has to 
pay a commission (R) to those relay peers also who fall in its query path and 
perform relaying only. This means requesting peer has to pay total amount 
equal to  
  ∑   
 
 
 
Where r is number of relays happened to occur in successful query path.  If 
requesting peer denies to pay this much amount than it’s refrained from 
accessing the requested data time. Meeting query deadline is very important 
in such environment; as if requesting peer gets data item after query deadline 
then he is allowed to refuse to pay for his content even to relaying peers.  
Revenue of a peer can be calculated as difference between virtual currencies 
earned by him against replica hosting or relaying and the amount spend by him 
for accessing desired content from other peers. 
Setting price of data items:  One Intuitive policy could be that the more 
recently and frequently data item is requested more is the price but it’s not 
considers the no of replicas of that particular item or number of peers serving 
that data item that should also be considered therefore as result price of any 
data item increases as it is served against requests originated from more 
mobile peers. Other than this replica consistency and faster query response 
can also be included when deciding price like more consistency level implies 
higher prices similarly more the faster response to the queries higher will be 
the prices for those data items. 
The data items kept by hosts having low energy are priced high so that energy 
can be conserved and the low energy peers can be sustained in system. 
Similarly data items with high Time to live are priced higher enough because 
they can produce more revenue for longer time period. As replication of some 
data item increases its price decreases. 
E-ARL Bid Based Economic Replica Allocation: Replica allocation is done by a 
special peer called Super Peer (SP).  
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Figure-6 Replica Allocation in E-ARL 
*NR is the number of required replicas for data 
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The peer who wants to provide his data for replication is called Provide peer 
and the peers who are interested in replicating data are called Host peers. 
All the Host peers send their bids to SP and SP allocates replicas of higher 
priced data to higher bidders. Replicating data are called Host peers. All the 
Host peers send their bids to SP and SP allocates replicas of higher priced data 
to higher bidders. 
Basic Algorithm: we can divide whole algorithm into seven steps as depicted in 
Figure-6 which is divided in two sub figures ‘a’ and ‘b’. 
Step-1 All the peers who want to provide their data items for bidding send 
their request to Super peer (SP). SP adds all the replication to a list called 
replica list (  ). 
Step-2 Now SP sends a broadcast message to all the peers for bidding and this 
broadcast messages entails the price, size and time to expire information for 
each data item in . SP sends only one broadcast message for all items to 
conserve energy and bandwidth usage. 
Step-3 After getting broadcast message from SP, all the interested peers send 
their bids for corresponding data items. SP adds all bids to a list called Bid List. 
Step-4 SP traverses whole Bid List and filters out the not eligible bidders from 
the list. It eliminates all the bid entries whose energy is below the threshold 
THE or whose load is above the threshold THL or whose bandwidth is below the 
threshold THB. 
Step-5 After getting list of eligible bids, SP calculates whether NB <= NR is true 
or not. NR is the number of required replicas for data item d, NB is the number 
of remaining bids for data item d. 
Step-6 If the inequality stated above comes to be true then SP simply allocates 
NR replicas to NR peers.  
 Else it selects top-K entries out of Bid_List and allocates NR replicas to peers 
having lowest λ for storage.     
Step-7 Now SP sends messages to all peers who are allocated with replicas to 
release one-time payment for their replica. 
Here k is usually set to 2*NR. 
We can see that this economic based replication scheme is fairly elegant but 
simple and bid based allocation of replicas is quite helpful in maintaining 
sufficient data availability and it also motivates peers to participate and earn 
wealth so that they can use it against their own data items needed. This 
scheme is also effective to reduce free riding. 
 
Eco Rare: An Economic incentive scheme for Efficient Rare 
Data Accessibility in Mobile-P2P networks 
 
There can be such real world scenarios, where some rare data items get very 
important and demanded due to occurrence of some events otherwise they 
are rarely accessed and kept by very few peers. Eco Rare is specifically 
designed and devised for such scenarios. 
We can think of some scenarios similar to as stated above, suppose there some 
gas emission happens in some city then there will be urgent need of gas masks 
in that particular location. Many users will now be interested in knowing about 
gas masks, their price and shops to purchase. Similar situation may arise in 
case of sudden snowfall, Then a huge number of people will be willing to buy 
shovels, will query about their prices, availability and probable locations to buy 
them. Information regarding these rare data is collected through 
advertisements published by shops (gas mask, shovel shops) but these kind of 
rare data is not accessible easily because of less replication of these data and 
which is quite likely because these data items are demanded only  when 
certain event occurs. 
 
Basic Eco Rare:  Each data item in this scheme is assumed to be associated 
with two kinds of prices namely  
Use_Price (Pu): This price serves only limited information about the data 
without any sort of ownership, therefore requester cannot resell this data to 
others. For an example let’s take gas mask and shovels, in case of use price 
user gets only very little information for gas masks and shovels like some shops 
and prices of these goods at those shops. 
 
Sell_Price (Ps): Against the sell price user gets more detailed information about 
the data along with its ownership too, therefore user can now resell the data 
to others. A data item can have multiple owners in this scheme and due to this 
we can ensure availability of data even in the absence of some owner peers. In 
case of sell_price, user will get elaborated information for shopping gas masks 
and shovels like complete catalogues of more shops selling these items, how to 
purchase these items (online, phone delivery etc.) and even price comparison 
chart for different shops. 
Combatting with free riding: In this system requester have to pay relay charge 
to all relay peers, who are in successful query path so that quicker query 
forwarding can be done and in this way each mobile peer has to pay a constant 
money to relay peers to get his query forwarded. Due to these imposed costs 
free riding is almost impossible in such system because peers have to have 
currency to issue their own requests and to do so, they have to somehow earn 
money and they can only earn through either by hosting some data or relaying 
other peer’s requests.  
Eco Rare contributes in several ways to conventional peer to peer sharing 
system like 
1) It combats free riding effectively and in turn improves data availability 
as free riders are now actively involved. 
2) Since there can be multiple owners of a data item, multiple replicas of 
rare item are created. 
3) Availability and response time increases as relay peers also get 
incentives for relaying queries. 
Revenue of an MP:  Revenue of a MP can be calculated as  
Virtual currency earned by (Hosting data items +relaying service for others) - 
Virtual currency paid for (Buying data items + Relaying cost for own queries)  
Data selling mechanism of EcoRare:  there are two kinds of selling ways 
defined by this scheme 
Query-based selling:  In this case when a peer request to buy something, it’s 
allocated with a replica of the corresponding data item means it becomes an 
owner of that item and it can resell it any time (Figure-7 (a)). 
Push/Pull-based selling: 
Push based:  In this case, the scenario where a peer is remained with very low 
energy. It wants to quit the system and sell his data items to get currency 
(Figure-7 (b)). 
Pull-based:  Pull based mechanism is usually adopted by free riders, since to 
issue query they must have some currency to pay and therefore they have buy 
some data from other peers so that they can earn money by selling them to 
others (Figure-7 (c)). 
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Algorithm EcoRare Seller MP:  Data providing peers are called Sellers and 
query issuing peers are termed as Buyers. Steps for Eco Rare Seller algorithm 
are pretty straight forward. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that ᵩ signifies here the revenue-earning potential of data items and we 
have broadcasted the data items to only N neighbors rather than all of them to 
reduce communication overhead. 
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Figure-8 Flow Chart for Eco Rare Seller 
 Algorithm Eco Rare Buyer MP:  Buyer algorithm is fairly intuitive and simple 
and it’s depicted below via flow chart.  
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Figure-9 Flow Chart for Eco Rare Buyer 
As a conclusion we can say that Eco Rare effectively combats free riding and 
involves free riders for participation and improves availability of rare data very 
efficiently.  
 
 
ABIDE: A Bid-based Economic Incentive Model for Enticing 
Non-cooperative Peers in Mobile-P2P Networks 
 
In mobile peer to peer systems problem of “Tragedy of Commons” is very 
prevalent as we have discussed several times from the start of this survey.  
Incentive schemes are suggested to reduce the free riders and these schemes 
are proved to be fairly effective, ABIDE in essence is a similar effort to 
overcome the free riding problem by a novel bid based incentive model. 
 
It not only motivates relay peers to work as broker for value added routing but 
also helps new peers to earn revenues in order to obtain services and 
encourages effective data sharing and resource sharing. 
 
 
Basic model of ABIDE:  Each Mobile peers creates an index of services (data 
item + peers having this data) and each relay peer is provided with an amount 
of incentive for searching on behalf of query issuer’s query. These indexes are 
generated on the fly based queries issued to it and different peers may have 
entirely different indexes. 
User issues his query through broadcasting, the peer who receives this query 
checks whether needed data is indexed in its index against some peer or not 
and if it happens to be false, it just forwards the query to some neighbor peer 
to get relay commission. On the other hand if the result is indexed then it 
issues a new query to destined peer to get answer and it acts as a broker. 
Commission for relaying is quite less than brokering. 
 
 
Network topology in ABIDE:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
In figure-10 Q is query issuing peer and from R1 to R9 are relay peers similarly 
from B1 to B4 are the broker peer and from D1 to D5 are the data providing 
peers. Let’s take some scenarios and analyse what will be the role of different 
entries as depicted above. 
Scenario1: Suppose Q issues a query and the desired data is at D2 data 
providing peer. In this case we can see that only one relay peer is there 
between Q and D2. Therefore Q has to pay 1 unit relay cost to R6 and price of 
data to D2. 
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Figure-10 Network topology in ABIDE 
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Scenario2: Suppose Q issues a query for let’s say data d and data d have two 
copies in system i.e. at D4, D3. Now there are three promising query paths to 
get data d. First is {R5, R9, D3}, second is {R5, B3, R8, D4} and third is {R1, B2, 
D4}. First and second path is having two relay peers but second is having one 
broker peer too that’s why we can omit second path for consideration. Now 
only first and third are left for candidature. First path is having two relays and 
third path is having one relay and one broker, since relay charge is less than 
broker’s charge therefore path first will be chosen (assuming issuer has index 
for required data himself). 
Algorithm ABIDE Query Issuing MPs: Steps in algorithm  
Steps1: Broadcast query for desired data item d. 
Steps2: Receive all the bids and evaluate value of ᵞ each bid. 
Steps3: Select the bid for which ᵞ is highest and select the corresponding 
broker and send message to him. 
Steps4: receive data from broker and his commission based strategy chosen 
(PPA or NPA). 
Where PPA stands for Privacy-Preserving Auction model where query issuer 
remains anonymous to data provider and NPA stands for Non-Privacy 
preserving Auction model where anonymity is not maintained. Where ᵞ is a 
score which constitutes of two parameters namely query response and data 
quality.                                        γ = a × RT + b × DQ 
RT is response time for query and DQ is Data quality. a and b are constants and 
calculated experimentally. 
Conclusion 
Firstly, we have covered several incentive based schemes suggested for mobile 
peer to peer networks having different approaches to tackle similar problems 
and even we have gone through entirely different scenarios and problems of 
modern P2P systems. Mobile peer to peer environment, which is quite 
constrained in terms of energy, resources and protocols, we have seen these 
techniques are provably beneficial for such unstable mobile environment 
which can get easily posed to unpredictable situations like network 
partitioning, peer quitting and critically less data availability. 
Secondly, we have described what the free riding problem is all about and how 
to handle free riding effectively in mobile peer to peer environment. Since free 
riding is very challenging for P2P systems, we have elaborated this issue quite 
well and described handful schemes to handle it. We have also described some 
schemes for data replication for MP2P environment so that data availability 
can be improved and even to increase availability of some particular kind of 
data only, whose demand arises based on occurrence of some specific events.   
As a conclusion, incentive schemes for Mobile Peer–to-Peer Systems are fairly 
effective and promising to solve challenges of modern P2P system and free 
riding problem. 
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